by J. D. Harlock
Game theory is the study of strategic decision-making when outcomes depend on a player’s actions and the actions of others involved. Analyzing interactions between political actors using game theory allows us to theorize why specific actions are taken. As an academic with a master’s degree in International Relations (IR), it’s helped me conceptualize fictional scenarios through theoretical modeling. In this article, I’ll share one approach for creators to use game theory to build believable political tensions, strategic standoffs, and high-stakes diplomacy in their speculative IR stories.
Scenario
For my cyberpunk potboiler, I’ve envisioned a Cold War-esque standoff between two nuclear superpowers. Tensions have reached a point of no return at the story’s onset, so I have to figure out how and why the superpowers will act and react from that point on.
Guiding Theoretical Framework
Starting out, I’ve decided that IR in this fictional world will operate on the principles of the realist school of thought. In terms of worldbuilding, their principles translate into an anarchic system of rational unitary actors engaging in strategic decisions to maximize utility in terms of power, security, and survival. As such, rational deterrence theory (which emerged from Cold War-era realist thought) applies well, advocating for deterrence by convincing adversaries that the cost of aggression outweighs potential benefits. Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), as featured in Dr. Strangelove, was developed from this theory. It’s a military strategy doctrine that posits that a full-scale nuclear war on a nuclear-armed defender with second-strike capabilities (i.e., the ability to strike back) results in complete annihilation. It can act as the national security policy of the superpowers involved. As a result, the superpowers may use brinkmanship (i.e., leveraging escalating threats to force opponents to concede) to advance their interests, but it’s risky. Even under MAD, war can occur.
The bargaining model of war can make sense of that, explaining that war is a costly diplomatic failure among rational actors, a failure caused by three barriers: incomplete information, trust/commitment issues, and the indivisibility of what is fought over. Settling on this theoretical framework for IR in my fictional world, classical game theory will be used to model it.
Limitations
The rational actor assumption holds that players make strategic decisions based on expected outcomes. Rational actors, in turn, have consistent preferences that optimize their position and change their stances according to new information. In modern IR, players are rarely rational actors because they tend not to be unitary actors, as competing domestic factions can lead to an incoherent foreign policy. In addition, cultural, ideological, psychological, and behavioral factors are at play that can impact decision-making. Finally, leaders are also prone to error through misperception, acting irrationally, or being subject to logical fallacies and biases.
Since speculative IR is watered down for focus on the plot with a limited cast of characters, foreign policy will be limited to the leadership of the superpowers, and, since I want them to be calm, collected, and competent, I can model decision-making as if everyone is a rational unitary actor.
Characteristics
Factors may vary in the real world, but in my fictional scenario, I’ve determined that the standoff occurring under my theoretical framework is a game that is:
- unknown finite repetitious: The base game is iterated, so past actions must be considered when determining others’ behaviour moving forward.
- incomplete imperfect: Each player lacks relevant information when making certain choices, especially about their actions’ payoffs.
- non-zero-sum to positive-sum: Initially, it’s a non-zero-sum game since an advantage for one side is not necessarily equivalent to a loss for the other. Ongoing stability and diplomacy introduce positive-sum dimensions where both sides benefit from mutual survival and stable peace.
Game Type
Games of chicken are often used to model MAD, in which the ideal outcome is for one player to yield, but both try to avoid it, and based on what I’ve determined up until now, I think it describes the standoff best. Knowing this, we can derive the standard solutions from the research that allows us to figure out how strategic interactions tend to play out in this scenario.
Solutions
- Asymmetric Nash Equilibria: No nuclear war occurs if one player yields. Even though the outcome is stable, it’s politically unsustainable in the long run due to reputation damage, which will factor into some of the rounds of the scenario I’m presenting in my story to ratchet up tensions.
- Mixed Strategy Equilibria: Mixed strategies randomize actions with probabilities, making them unpredictable. Each player thus randomly chooses between yielding and committing to maintain credible deterrence. In MAD, nuclear war is avoided, but miscalculation could lead to conflict as stability relies on credibility, risk management, fear, and cooperation. Stability could be secured through a number of plot points, such as securing second-strike capabilities, military-to-military communication, crafting NFU (No First Use) Doctrines, and signing arms control agreements. For my story, this will be more or less the status quo that the story returns to up until the climax.
Destabilization
Games are stable when slight deviations self-correct and actors are incentivized to return to equilibrium strategies. In MAD, it’s when actors are rational, second-strike capable, and recognize that deviation ensures mutual destruction. Unfortunately, I want to ratchet up tensions for the final confrontation, so I must destabilize this fragile equilibrium. In terms of a plot twist, instability can be introduced when a first-strike advantage is realized, deterrence is found to be bluffed, misperceptions and accidents occur, and asymmetric (e.g., when one side places a much higher value on a disputed issue than the other) or irrational preferences emerge (e.g., when the leadership exhibits signs of mental illness).
Practical Steps
As you’re plotting out your scenario, answering developmental prompts with informed responses will flesh out your world with verisimilitude. For example, you can ask yourself:
- Considering the worldbuilding established, is brinkmanship even plausible?
- If so, how would it manifest between factions and for how long?
- Under what conditions can it be resolved, either peacefully or violently?
Conclusion
Understanding strategic behavior helps writers craft more compelling political plots, deepen character motivations, and explore ethical dilemmas in speculative settings. Numerous theoretical frameworks exist to map out scenarios without this one’s limitations. Still, speculative IR models can’t always capture real life—nor should they—but they should possess a verisimilitude complementing the readers’ willing suspension of disbelief. Ultimately, what matters is choosing a solid framework that fits the internal logic of your fictional worlds. After all, politics, even in speculative fiction, remains the art of the possible.
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J. D. Harlock is an Eisner Award-nominated American writer, researcher, editor, and academic pursuing a doctoral degree at the University of St. Andrews, whose writing has been featured in Strange Horizons, Nightmare Magazine, The Griffith Review, Queen’s Quarterly, and New York University’s Library of Arabic Literature.